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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

KENNETH JAMES MORRELL,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890031-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of robbery, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1978).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did either Officer Wayment's testimony concerning a

telephone number listed in a police report or the limitation of
cross-examination of Matthew Moor infringe on defendant's right
to confrontation?

Being a question of law, this Court must

review it for correctness.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,

1070 (Utah 1985); Western Fiberglass v. Kirton, McConkie &
Bushnell, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
2.

If Officer Wayment's testimony or Matthew Moor's

examination violated defendant's right of confrontation, did
defendant preserve this issue for appeal?

If the issue was not

waived, is any constitutional violation harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt?

This presents questions of law not determined

by the court below.

This Court must make original legal

determinations regarding waiver and prejudice.

Delaware v. Van

Arsdall# 475 IKS. 673, 681 (1986) (relying on Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
122 (Utah 1989).
3.

If Officer Wayment's testimony or Matthew Moor's

examination did not violate defendant's right of confrontation,
did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling on these
evidentiary matters?

Evidentiary rulings are reviewed only for a

clear abuse of discretion.

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035

(Utah 1987); State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

allowing the State to present impeachment evidence of defendant's
pre-Miranda warning failure to exculpate himself?

As an

evidentiary ruling, this issue is subject to the clear abuse of
discretion standard stated above.
4.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in

admitting evidence of defendant's prior robbery under Utah R.
Evid. 609(a)(2)?

Where evidence is improperly admitted, this

Court must review its admission for prejudicial effect; that is,
absent the error, is there a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for defendant?

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 121,

n.10 (Utah 1989); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).
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5.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

admitting as rebuttal evidence defendant's prior robbery for
purposes of proving defendant's intent under Utah R. Evid. 403
and 404(b)?

As an evidentiary ruling, this issue is subject to

the clear abuse of discretion standard stated above.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable statutes, constitutional provisions and
rules for a determination of this case are in pertinent part:
U.S. Const, amend. Vis
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
Utah R. Evid. 103(a):
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record, stating
the specific ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the
context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is
one excluding evidence, the substance of the
evidence was made known to the court by offer
or was apparent from the context within which
questions were asked.
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Utah R. Evid. 403s
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b)s
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
Utah R. Evid. 609(a):
(a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during crossexamination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)s
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.
statement is not hearsay if:
•

A

• •

(2) Admission by party-opponent. The
statement is offered against a party and
is (A) his own statement, in either his
individual or a representative capacity,
or (B) a statement of which he has
manifested his adoption or belief in its
truth, or (C) a statement by a person
«4_

authorized by him to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement
by his agent or servant concerning a
matter within the scope of his agency or
employment, made during the existence of
the relationship, or (E) a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course
and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Utah R. Evid. 803s
The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness.
(6) Records of regularly conducted
activity. A memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business
activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by
the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of
information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
The term "business" as used in this paragraph
includes business, institution, association,
profession, occupation, and calling of every
kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
.

• •

(8) Public records and reports. Records,
reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies,
setting forth (A) the activities of the
office or agency, or (B) matters observed
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil
actions and proceedings and against the
Government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless
the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Kenneth J. Morrell, was charged with
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978) (R. 23-24, 30). On December 1, 1988,
a jury trial commenced before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon,
Judge, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah (R. 27). On December 2, 1988, the jury returned a verdict
of guilty of the lesser included offense of robbery, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1978)
(R. 28, 118). On December 19, 1988, defendant was sentenced to
the statutory indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at the
Utah State Prison, to run concurrently with his previous sentence
and with credit for time served awaiting trial (R. 122).
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on January 18, 1989 (R. 123).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At approximately midnight on September 4, 1988,
Ambassador Pizza received a telephone call to deliver pizza and a
soft drink to 813 Genessee Street, Salt Lake City Utah.

The call

constituted the last delivery for the night (T. 14-15).
Matthew Moor, a nineteen year delivery man for
Ambassador Pizza, drove to what he thought was Genessee Street
near 800 West (T. 15). He observed defendant standing on the
The two volumes of trial transcript (R. 137 and 138) have been
paginated separately, as opposed to continuously. To avoid
confusion and to be consistent with appellant's brief, volume R.
137, the trial transcript for December 1, 1988, will be referred
to as (T. - ) , and volume R. 138, the trial transcript for
December 2, 1988, as (T2. - ) . Additionally, volume R. 139 is a
miscellaneous volume containing the hearings on defendant's
motion in limine and his sentencing. These will be referred to
respectively as (MT. -) and (ST. - ) .
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corner and asked him if the street was in fact Genessee (T. 15).
Defendant said MyesM and then asked Moor if he had seen a red
Camero; Moor said "no" (T. 15-16).

Moor proceeded to the

delivery address, about two houses from the corner (T. 15, 16).
No lights were on in the house and no one answered when Moor
knocked on the door (T. 16). Moor returned to his car "and was
getting ready to leave and [defendant] came and approached [Moor]
with what [Moor] thought was the intention of buying a pizza from
[him]" (T. 16). Defendant asked Moor what type of pizza it was,
stating he did not want it if it had green peppers and onions (T.
16).

Normally, Moor would not try to resell pizza but since it

was the last delivery of the evening, he decided to sell the
pizza to defendant rather than throw it away (T.

16-17).

Throughout this conversation, Moor was sitting in his car with
the window rolled down (T. 17). When Moor told defendant he
could purchase the pizza for $5.00, defendant replied, "Why don't
you give me the pizza for free?" (T. 18). Defendant then grabbed
Moor, holding what Moor thought was a knife to his neck, and told
Moor that he was being robbed (T. 18). Even though Moor could
not see the knife, he felt something sharp, "sharp enough that
[he] wasn't going to struggle" (T. 20). Defendant told Moor to
hand over the keys to the car and then defendant got into the
passenger side of the vehicle (T. 20, 21). The pizza and drink
were left on the street (T. 52).
Once in the car, defendant demanded money from Moor (T.
21).

Moor gave defendant about $26.00 from one of his pants

pockets.

Defendant then asked Moor where his "bank" was (T. 21).
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A "bank" is a small, leather carrying case used by the drivers to
carry money at night (T. 22). Moor had put his "bank",
containing approximately $800.00 dollars, in his pants because he
was somewhat suspicious when there were no lights on at the
delivery address (T. 37, 53-54).

Moor told him that a co-worker

had mistakenly taken his "bank" on the last delivery (T. 22).
Defendant told Moor to drive to a "very dark place,"
telling Moor that he was going to search the car for the "bank"
(T. 22-23).

Throughout the drive, defendant held the knife to

Moor's side, threatening to kill him if he did not cooperate (T.
23-24).

At the location, defendant searched the car (T. 24).
Moor suggested that they drive to a house around 1000

East and 400 South, claiming that his girlfriend lived there and
that she would give Moor money (T. 25). Moor knew that no one
would be at the address but thought, since it was only four
blocks from Ambassador Pizza, he might be able to get help (T.
25).
When no one answered at the Fourth South house,
defendant told Moor to drive towards the "Avenues" area and find
a house without any lights on so that they could "eventually do
what he had done to me, rob Domino's" (T. 26). Moor testified
that he was continuing to cooperate with defendant because he was
afraid (T. 24, 27-8).

On the way, defendant had Moor stop at a

drive-up pay telephone at 800 East 200 South and call Domino's
Pizza.

No one answered as Domino's was closed (T. 28).
Defendant told Moor that he was "sick of these games".

Defendant said he did not believe Moor and that Moor "had one
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last chance to get him the amount of money he wanted, and if that
didn't work that he would use the knife" (T. 29). Moor responded
that a co-worker might have some money.

Moor drove to the co-

worker's, Ivan's, house at 1985 South 200 East (T. 29-30).
Defendant told Moor to back into the driveway, roll up the
windows, lock the doors, and then honk and yell for Ivan (T. 30).
Moor did so, hitting the fence as he backed into the driveway (T.
58).
Ivan Ilov, thirty-six years old, heard the honking and
came out to the car (T. 69-71).

It was about 2:00 a.m. and Ivan

thought Moor was playing some kind of joke.

But when Ivan looked

into the car, he observed Moor's "sweat-out eyes" and "worried"
look" and realized "something was wrong" (T. 71). Ivan tried to
get a better look at defendant who was leaning against Moor (T.
71-72).

Moor asked Ivan for some money, stating "I have a guy

with a knife in my back, can you get as much money as you can."
(T. 72, 77-78).

Simultaneously, Moor grabbed defendant's hand

and Ivan broke through the driver's window of the car (T. 32,
73).

Ivan testified that he broke the window "because at the

moment I was trying to open the door.

I realized the door is

locked and the guy [the defendant] got nervous and I got a
feeling he was already penetrating with the knife, so I got
really wild and I broke the window" (T. 73). A brief struggle
occurred.

Defendant jumped out of the car and Ivan and Moor

began to chase him (T. 62, 73).
Moor caught up with defendant. Defendant hit him,
breaking Moor's nose (T. 62, 74). Defendant continued to run and
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Moor caught up again, tackling defendant near the Sconecutter
Restaurant, 2100 South State (T. 62-63, 75). When Ivan caught
up, defendant was still wrestling with Moor.

Ivan helped subdue

defendant (T. 34, 75). Moor waived down a passing taxicab,
telling the driver to call the police (T. 35, 76). When Moor
asked defendant where he had put the money, defendant pulled the
money from his pockets and threw it on the ground.

Moor picked

it up (T. 76). Moor went into the Sconecutter to wash himself
while waiting for the police (T. 82).
When the police arrived, Moor was still in the
Sconecutter restaurant and Ivan was holding defendant (T2. 9).
Officer Miller went to one side of defendant and took defendant's
arm, holding it up behind his back.

Officer Neeley stood by

defendant's other side (T2. 13). After the victim was
interviewed, defendant was placed under arrest (T2. 5). No
weapon was ever recovered.
Defendant testified on his own behalf (T2. 20). He did
not deny the encounter with Matthew Moor, the subsequent attempts
to get more money or the altercation at Ivan Ilov's home (T2. 2336).

Instead, defendant claimed he had met Moor in July at a

party and had given Moor $45.00 worth of marijuana without
receiving any payment (T2. 25-26, 47). Defendant stated that it
was merely a coincidence that he was standing on the corner when
Moor drove by to deliver the pizza (T2. 22). Defendant
maintained that his sole reason for approaching Moor was to get
the money owed him.

Defendant denied any intent to rob the

victim (T2. 39-40, 53, 58).
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Matthew Moor denied ever meeting defendant and denied
purchasing any marijuana from him (T. 35-36, 41-43).
In rebuttal, Paul Christensen testified that in June
1988, he was robbed by defendant (T2. 75). In that robbery, a
telephone order for pizza and a soft drink had been placed to
Free Wheeler Pizza late on a Saturday night (T2. 75, 83). Mr.
Christensen drove to the address given.
house was dark and no one answered.
side of the house.

When he got there, the

Defendant appeared from the

Mr. Christensen thought defendant had ordered

the pizza (T2. 75). Defendant asked Mr. Christensen what the
pizza cost and started digging in his pockets as if to get money.
Suddenly, defendant knocked the pizza and drink out of
Christensen's hand and pulled out a gun (T2. 76). Defendant told
Christensen to lie on the ground and to give him all his money
and checks.

Christensen turned over approximately $200.00.

Defendant asked where the rest of the money was and if
Christensen had any money in his car.

Christensen said "no".

Defendant told Christensen to walk down the street.

Christensen

did and when he turned around, defendant was gone (T2. 76-77).
Defendant did not deny his culpability for the robbery
of Christensen in June.

In fact, defendant had pled guilty to

that crime (T2. 55, 86-87).

Defendant maintained that he had

committed the Christensen robbery because of a drug habit, a
habit which he claimed he was undergoing treatment for one or two
months prior to the Moor altercation (T2. 56, 60-62, 86-87).
The jury was instructed on the crime charged,
aggravated robbery, and its lesser included offense, robbery (R.
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101-103, Court's Instructions to Jury).

The jury returned a

verdict of guilty to the lesser included offense of robbery (R.
118).

On appeal, defendant has not raised any issue* concerning

the appropriateness of the jury instructions or the sufficiency
of the evidence for conviction.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not violate defendant's right to
confrontation in allowing testimony concerning a telephone number
listed in a police report or in limiting cross-examination of the
victim-witness.

Further, defendant failed to preserve any

confrontation issue for purposes of appeal by only objecting on
general evidentiary grounds.

Even if defendant did not waive

this issue and a violation of his right to confrontation did
occur, any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on
the totality of the evidence at trial.
The trial court properly allowed the State to present
impeachment evidence of defendant's silence prior to any Miranda
warnings.

The issue is not ones of defendant's right to a Miranda

warning but of the right of the State to use probative evidence
disputing defendant's claim of innocence at trial.
The trial court erred in automatically admitting into
evidence, pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2), defendant's
previous conviction of robbery as a crime of dishonesty.

The

error is harmless, however, because the court subsequently and
properly admitted evidence of the same crime under Utah R. Evid.
404(b) to establish defendant's intent.

Further, even if the

evidence had not been admitted, based on the totality of the
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record, there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION IN PROPERLY EXERCISING
ITS DISCRETION IN RULING ON EVIDENTIARY
MATTERS.
Defendant asserts that the trial court violated
defendant's right to confrontation in two ways: 1) in allowing an
officer to testify to a telephone number contained in a police
report, and 2) in sustaining objections to certain questions
posed during cross-examination of the victim (Br. of App. at 1215).

In raising this argument, defendant concedes that under

State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), the state and federal
constitutional provisions on confrontation should be construed
similarly, and does not argue for any separate state
constitutional interpretation (Br. of App. at 11 n.2). As such,
the State will limit its discussion to federal constitutional
analysis.

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah

1988); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986).
As noted by defendant, the sixth amendment right to
confrontation primarily involves the right of cross-examination,
which encompasses both the admission of out-of-court statements
and limitations on the scope of cross-examination.

Kentucky v.

Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736-737 (1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 65
(1988).

Functionally, the confrontation clause is interpreted so

as to promote reliability in evidence considered by the factfinder in a criminal trial.

Id. at 737.
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Similarly, the rules of evidence governing hearsay have
as their core a concern for providing a defendant the right to be
confronted by the witnesses against him.
399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).

California v. Green,

But,

[w]hile it may readily be conceded that
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause
are generally designed to protect similar
values, it is quite a different thing to
suggest that the overlap is complete and
treat the Confrontation Clause is nothing
more or less than a codification of the rules
of hearsay and their exceptions as they
existed historically at common law. Our
decisions have never established such a
congruence; indeed, we have more than once
found a violation of confrontation values
even though the statements in issue were
admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay
exception. . . . The converse is equally
true: merely because evidence is admitted in
violation of a long-established hearsay rule
does not lead to the automatic conclusion
that confrontation rights have been denied.
.Id. at 155-156.

Accord State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204-205

(Utah 1987) (citations and footnote omitted).

The fallacy of

defendant's argument is in failing to recognize this distinction
and by equating, what at best are, improper evidentiary rulings
with prejudicial constitutional deprivations (Br. of App. at 1415).
A. The Admission of Information from a
Police Report.
Defendant argues that the trial court violated
defendant's right to confrontation by allowing Officer Wade
Wayment to testify during the State's rebuttal as to a telephone
number listed in a police report.

A brief discussion of the

evidentiary context of Officer Wayment's testimony is necessary
before turning to a discussion of its admissibility.
-14-

Throughout the trial, defendant had presented the
defense that despite having physically done all the acts
testified to by the victim, defendant lacked any intent to rob
the victim and was merely collecting a debt.

The defense was

discussed in evidentiary hearings (MT. 9-12), alluded to in
defendant's opening statement (T. 9-11), developed during crossexamination of the victim (T. 41-43), and fully presented by
defendant during his direct testimony (T2. 22-41).

After

extensive pre-admission evidentiary hearings, the State was
allowed on rebuttal to present evidence of a prior robbery,
similar in nature, to which defendant had pled guilty (T2. 682
79).
After the details of the previous robbery had been
testified to by the victim in that case, Paul Christensen,
Officer Wade Wayment testified.
The officer stated that, in the case before the court,
the telephone number given Ambassador Pizza in ordering the pizza
was not connected to 813 Genessee Street as represented by the
person placing the order, but was to a pay telephone at Smith's
Food Store, 828 South 900 West, a block away (T2. 81-82).

This

information was admitted without objection.
Officer Wayment then testified that he had reviewed the
police report in the prior Christensen robbery (T2. 82). Officer
Wayment was asked if he had obtained a telephone number given to
Free Wheeler Pizza in that case (T2. 82-83).

Defendant objected

for "lack of foundation, hearsay" (T2. 83). The court ordered
2
The admissibility of this evidence under Utah R. Evid. 404(b)
to prove defendant's intent during the encounter will be
discussed separately under Point IV.
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the prosecutor to "lay a foundation where he is getting that
information from" (T2. 83), The officer testified that he got
the information from the police report, which was prepared and
kept in the ordinary course of police business.

Defendant

renewed the objection on the same grounds; the objection was
overruled (T2. 83). Officer Wayment then testified that based on
the police report, the telephone number of 466-0438 was given
when the order was placed to Free Wheeler Pizza.

The officer

testified that he searched for the location of such a telephone,
but the number could not be connected to any location (T2. 83).
Because the officer knew that the address given in ordering the
pizza was in the area of 1300 South and 900 East, he transposed
the telephone number to 466-0348 and connected it to a pay
telephone at a 7-11 store, a few blocks from the location of the
Christensen robbery (T2. 84).
On surrebuttal, defendant testified that he did in fact
commit the Christensen robbery as testified to by Paul
Christensen, including having made the telephone call ordering
the pizza from a pay telephone (T2. 86-89).
Defendant now argues that in allowing Officer Wayment
to testify from the police report as to the telephone number used
by defendant in setting up the Christensen robbery, defendant's
right to confrontation was violated.

In the context of the

evidence, the argument is specious.
First and foremost, defendant never denied his
involvement in the Christensen robbery; nor did he ever contest
the evidence presented by Paul Christensen as to how the robbery

-1 £_

occurred.

Rather, throughout the pretrial hearing, the issue was

the evidence's admissibility under Utah R. Evid. 404(b), not the
accuracy or reliability of the facts (MT. 13). This was also
defendant's position at trial (T. 93-101; T2. 70-73, 86-89).
Therefore, there was no reliability issue involved, only one of
relevance and possible prejudice.
Further, defendant never raised the confrontation issue
below.

Instead, both objections were worded as being for "lack

of foundation, hearsay" (T2. 83). An objection on grounds of
hearsay does not necessarily include within it an objection on
confrontational grounds; for, the constitutional provision does
not require that hearsay never be introduced.
is true.

Just the opposite

Numerous hearsay exceptions exist which do not fall

within the scope of the confrontation clause.

Dutton v. Evans,

400 U.S. 74, 80-82 (1970) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 407 (1965)).

Accord State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d at 204-205.

As such, this Court should only consider defendant's objection as
being a general hearsay objection, defendant having waived any
confrontation argument.

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35

(Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989); Utah R. Evid. 103(a).
Being an evidentiary matter, the ruling is reviewed only for a
clear abuse of discretion.

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035

(Utah 1987); State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Applying the hearsay rules, defendant argues that a
police report does not qualify for admission under the public
records exception of Utah R. Evid. 803(8) and cites in support
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State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983) (Br. of App. at 13).
However, Bertul does not completely preclude the consideration of
information in a police report.

Instead, the Utah Supreme Court

concluded that the police report itself is not ordinarily
admissible as a business record, Utah R. Evid. 803(6), or as a
public document, Utah R. Evid. 803(8), "except when offered to
prove simple routine matters which are based on first-hand
knowledge of the maker of the report and do not involve
conclusions, and when the 'circumstances of their preparation
indicate their trustworthiness1."

I_d. at 1185-86.

Here, the

only information derived from the police report was the telephone
number given to Free Wheeler Pizza by defendant in placing the
order which set up the Christensen robbery.

The telephone number

was not recorded by Free Wheeler Pizza in anticipation of
litigation, but was taken in the normal course of their business
in receiving the pizza order.

Icl. at 1184. Merely because the

police then included it in a police report does not transform it
into non-routine information.

Since the police report itself was

not introduced into evidence, the issue is not the admissibility
of the report, but the admissibility of specific information in
the report.

That information, a telephone number given and

recorded in the normal course of business, clearly falls within
3
the hearsay exceptions of Utah R. Evid. 803.
3
It is also arguable, under the unique circumstances of this
case, that the statement is not hearsay at all, being an
admission of defendant. Utah R. Crim. P. 801(d)(2). By the time
the officer testified, defendant had already admitted his guilt
of the Christensen robbery, Mr. Christensen had testified to the
details, and none of the facts surrounding the robbery were
challenged by defendant as inaccurate (T2. 55, 73-75; MT. 13).
-ift-

B. The Scope of Cross-Examination of the
Victim.
Defendant also raises a confrontation issue in relation
to, what defendant characterizes as, the unwarranted limitation
of cross-examination of the victim, Matthew Moor (Br. of App. at
14-15).

Specifically, defendant argues that his confrontation

right was violated when the trial court sustained objections to
defendant's questions of Moor as to his drug and alcohol use
during the summer months of 1988 (T. 43). However, defendant has
not adequately preserved the issue for appeal.

Rather, defendant

posed questions of the victim, and when objections were
sustained, defendant abandoned the line of questioning without
further argument or factual proffer (T. 42-44).

As such,

defendant has waived his claim on a constitutional ground.

Any

limitations should be reviewed only on general evidentiary
grounds for abuse of discretion.
34-35; Utah R. Evid. 103(a).

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at

The appropriateness of the

questions and adequancy of the objections must be evaluated in
light of Moor's testimony.
Matthew Moor, as the first State's witness, had
completed his direct testimony describing the robbery.

Moor had

stated that the only reason he had given money to defendant was
because of defendant's threatening demands (T. 21, 24-25, 31).
Moor testified that he had never met defendant prior to the night
of the robbery and did not recognize him from anywhere else (T.
35-36).

On cross-examination, Moor denied that defendant ever

3
Cont. Further, defendant in surrebuttal admitted placing the
call (T2. 86-89).
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represented that he knew Moor or that Moor owed him money (T. 4142).

Moor denied knowing anyone named Scott Perry, an individual

defendant later claimed introduced Moor to defendant at a party
in July 1988 (T. 42-42; T2. 25, 48). The following then ensued:
Q: (By Ms. Loy) Have you ever been to a
party on the east side of Salt Lake in the
area of Trolley Square where you might have
met Mr. Morrell and don't remember
specifically?
A: (By Matthew Moor) Well, there have been
parties that I have been to where I don't
remember anything. So, I don't know. I
don't remember ever having seen Mr. Morrell,
ever.
Q: When you say sometimes you don't remember
anything after being to a party, would that
be because of alcohol and drug use?
MR. REED: Objection, Your Honor.
see where we are going with this.

THE COURT:

I don't

Objection sustained.

Q. (By Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, have you ever
obtained marijuana from Ken Morrell?
MR. REED: Objection, Your Honor. He has
already said he doesn't know Mr. Morrell.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

Q. (By Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, is it possible
that you have met Mr. Morrell at a party and
you do not know remember him, meeting him at
a party because of some reason?
MR. REED: Your honor, this has been asked
and answered.
MS. LOY:

This is in a different form.

THE COURT:
this more.

Overruled.

I will let her pursue

. . .

Q: (BY Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, is it possible
that you met Mr. Morrell at a party at some
_on_

time in your past and do not remember because
you have for some reason not remembered what
occurred at a past party?
THE COURT: Wait a minute.
approach the bench.

Both of you

(Off the record discussion between Court and
counsel.)
Q. (BY Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, you indicated you
took some money out of your pocket and handed
it to Mr. Morrell; is that right?
(T. 43-44).
In the context of this case, the trial court did not
prevent defendant from proper inquiry into any bias or motive of
the victim appropriate to the jurors' consideration of the
witness's reliability.
680 (1986).

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,

Defendant's theory of the case was that he knew

Moor, recognized him the night of the robbery and approached him
to collect a debt.

The circumstances surrounding the debt were

irrelevant; the issue was defendant's intent in approaching Moor.
Moor repeatedly denied knowing defendant but admitted that he did
not always remember everything from the parties he attended (T.
44).

Once Moor denied ever knowing defendant but admitted that

he could have met him at a party and not remembered, the
predicate for defendant's theory of the case was laid.

Further

questioning would not have elicited any other information
supportive of defendant's claim that he knew Moor in light of
Moor's continued statements that he did not remember ever meeting
defendant and did not recognize him as someone he knew on the
night of the robbery.

Additionally, Moor had already refuted

defendant's claim that he told Moor that he was merely collecting
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a debt.

Whether or not Moor was ever under the influence of

drugs or alcohol at some previous undefined time, was not
relevant to Moor's recitation of the incident on the night in
question.

The trial judge properly and reasonably restricted

questioning that was repetitious and only marginally relevant to
Moor's present credibility or reliability.

Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. Accord State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d at
203 (right of cross-examination is limited by Utah R. Evid. 403;
phere is no right to "harass, annoy or humiliate the witness");
State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980).
C. Even If Any Error Was Committed, the
Error Is Harmless.
The State submits that a harmless-error analysis is
inapplicable in this case as no error was committed.

The

constitutional issues were not preserved for appeal; instead,
defendant only objected on evidentiary grounds.

As such, the

court's rulings amounted to nothing more than evidentiary
rulings, which should be upheld absent a clear abuse of
discretion.

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1987); State v.

Brown, 771 P.2d at 1094. Here, the court properly exercised its
discretion in ruling on both issues.
But assuming arguendo that the trial court's rulings
violated defendant's right to confrontation and that defendant
has not waived the issue, the standard of review is one of
harmless-error analysis as delineated under Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475

U.S. at 681. Accord State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah
1987).

That is:

[A]n otherwise valid conviction should not be
set aside if the reviewing court may
confidently say, on the whole record, that
the constitutional error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. . . . The harmless-error
doctrine recognizes the principle that the
central purpose of a criminal trial is to
decide the factual question of the
defendant's guilt or innocence, . . . and
promotes public respect for the criminal
process by focusing on the underlying
fairness of the trial rather than on the
virtually inevitable presence of immaterial
error. . . .
Delaware v. Van Arsdall 475 U.S. at 681 (citations omitted).
Assuming that the trial court improperly admitted into
evidence the telephone number contained in the police report or
unduly limited some questions on cross-examination, the effect of
the rulings could not have reasonably affected the outcome of the
case.

Defendant's involvement in the Christensen robbery and the

facts concerning that robbery were not in issue.
admitted to these matters.

Defendant

Thus, whether the pizza employee who

had taken the telephone number or the officer testified, is
wholly irrelevant to the outcome of this case.

Similarly,

whether or not Matthew Moor was ever under the influence of drugs
or alcohol is irrelevant to defendant's claim that he had
previously met Moor.

Moor testified that he had not met

defendant but admitted that he did not remember everything from
parties attended.

Follow-up questions concerning whether or not

Moor bought drugs from defendant were duplicative and
repetitious; Moor had already testified several times, both on
direct and cross, that he did not recognize defendant or believe
that he and defendant had ever met.

The scope of cross-

examination did not restrict defendant in developing the theory
of his case.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE STATE TO
PRESENT AS IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE DEFENDANT'S
PRE-MIRANDA FAILURE TO EXCULPATE HIMSELF.
At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief,
defendant presented Officer Susan Neeley as its first witness.
On direct examination, Officer Neeley testified that when
defendant was arrested and searched no evidence was seized from
defendant's person (T2. 3). Additionally, Officer Neeley
testified that she interviewed Matthew Moor and Ivan Ilov in
connection with the case but was not aware of what happened to
the money in question (T2. 4). On cross-examination, the
prosecutor asked:
At anytime prior to Mr. Morrell's arrest, did
[he] make any statements to you?
(T2. 5). Defendant objected on grounds of "improper comment"
(T2. 5). A hearing continued outside the presence of the jury.
Defendant restated the objection:
[M]y objection was stated, I believe, that
the question asked for an improper comment
upon my client's silence at the time he was
in custody, although the answer of the
officer was that he was not yet arrested,
Her previous testimony indicated that he was
restrained by a civilian. They arrived and
then patted him down. It appears without
further foundation that it was a comment upon
his silence upon arrest, and that is why I am
objecting.
(T2. 6). The State proffered that defendant's failure to
exculpate himself was relevant to show his intent at the time of
the incident in light of his trial claim that he was merely
collecting a debt from the victim (T2. 6-7). The court requested
further information as to the sequence of events.
-24-

Out of the presence of the jury. Officer Neeley
testified that she was dispatched to approximately 1900 South
State Street, in response to a call that a fight was occurring
(T2. 8), While traveling to the location, she received a second
dispatch that a pizza driver was missing at the same location
(T2. 8). Arriving, Officer Neeley observed defendant being held
by Ivan Ilov (T2. 8-9). Immediately, Officer Neeley went to one
side of defendant while Officer Miller held defendant with his
arm behind his back (T2. 9). Officer Miller asked defendant
"What was going on?" (T2. 9), Defendant did not respond.

No

further questions were asked of defendant (T2. 9). Officer
Neeley testified that even though defendant was not free to
leave, he was not a suspect or under arrest.

Instead, defendant

was being detained because:
[W]e [the police] didn't know what was going
on. When someone is being held like that, we
have to find out all of the facts.
(T2. 11). Officer Neeley stated that the detention continued for
investigative purposes until it could be determined from
conversation with the victim that a crime had occurred (T2. 1112).

At that point, defendant was placed under arrest by a third

officer, Officer Allred (T2. 5, 11). Based on this testimony,
the court overruled the objection, allowing testimony up to the
time of arrest (T2. 12). The jury was reconvened.
With the jury present, Officer Neeley testified that
she was in defendant's presence for approximately 10-15 minutes
(T2. 12). During that time, defendant made no statements to her.
Officer Miller asked defendant what was going on.
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Defendant did

4
not respond (T2. 13).
Defendant subsequently testified that he never heard
the police ask him any question (T2. 51).
On appeal, defendant claims that the introduction of
this evidence was constitutionally improper in that "Appellant
was in custody when Officer Miller asked him what was going on,
and was entitled to a Miranda warning" (Br. of App. at 18).
However, the issue is not whether or not defendant was entitled
to a Miranda warning, but whether defendant's pre-Miranda silence
could be used to rebut defendant's trial claim that he was not
involved in any criminal conduct on the night in question.
Before turning to this issue, the State will respond to the
Miranda argument posed by defendant.
There is no question that:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we m€*an questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freesdom of action in any
significant way.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (footnote omitted).
Custody was further explained by the United States Supreme Court
in California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983), where the Court
stated:
Although the circumstances of each case
must certainly influence a determination of
4
This represents the entire scope of questioning by the State as
to defendant's silence. (See T2. 12-13.)
_oc_

whether a suspect is "in custody" for
purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the
ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a
"formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement" of the degree associated with a
formal arrest. . • •
Id. at 1125 (citations omitted).
similar functional arrest test.

Utah appears to have adopted a
State v. Kelly# 718 P.2d 385,

391 (Utah 1986); Salt Lake City v. Garner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171
(Utah 1983).

Without analyzing the issue, it may be assumed

arguendo that defendant was being detained by the police and was
not free to leave (T2. 10-12).
More necessary to this case, is a determination of
whether the officer's question, "What is going on here?",
constituted interrogation.

As the Utah Supreme Court has

recognized:
[F]or the purpose of determining whether a
crime has been committed, investigation and
interview are critical; under such
circumstances, the warning is not required.
Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d at 1170. For,
[i]t would be wholly impractical and the law
does not require an officer who is
investigating suspicious circumstances to
give the "Miranda" warning to everyone of
whom he asks a question.
Id. at 1170 (quoting State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 305, 480 P.2d
736, 737 (1971)).

To constitute interrogation for Miranda

purposes, the police must subject a suspect to "express
questioning or its functional equivalent . . . not only to
express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part
of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
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elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980).

Rhode Island

Accord United States v.

Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 379 (10th Cir. 1985) (comment of police in
searching container that it contained "cocaine, too" did not
constitute comment which the police "should have known [was]
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response").
Here, the testimony established that the police had
received two dispatches, one that a fight was occurring, another
that a pizza driver was missing (T2, 8). Arriving on the scene,
they observed one citizen holding another (T2. 9). As Officer
Neeley testified, the police did not know at that point what, if
any, crime had been committed (T2. 11-12).

Because the one

witness had hold of defendant, the police took over, continuing
the hold but asking the general investigatory question of "What
is going on here?" (T2. 9-10).

When they did not receive a

response from defendant, they apparently sought other information
by interviewing Moor (T2. 11). Upon receiving the statement of
the victim, defendant was arrested (T2. 11). Under the facts of
this case, the police did nothing more than pose a single
investigatory question to defendant to determine the facts
surrounding the dispatch call.

Of course, the police were

suspicious that something criminal had occurred, but at the time
of the question, they did not know what or by whom (T2. 11-12).
The question posed was "justified and the answer may well have
disclosed some perfectly lawful activity."

State v. Carlsen, 480

P.2d at 737. Accord State v. Kelly# 718 P.2d at 391. Therefore,
no Miranda warning was required.
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But, as previously stated, the significant issue in
this case is not the Miranda issue, for no statements of
defendant were admitted into evidence.

Rather, the issue is

whether the introduction of defendant's silence constituted a
violation of defendant's constitutional right against selfincrimination.

Though not specifically raised by defendant, the

State addresses the issue pursuant to its duty to promote
justice.

State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah Ct. App.

1989).
Clearly, the State may not comment on or use in its
case-in-chief a defendant's silence in response to Miranda
warnings.

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).

But, a

different rule is applicable where no Miranda warning has been
given.

In the latter case, a defendant's silence is admissible

to impeach a defense offered for the first time at trial.
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605-607 (1982).

The reason for

the distinction is explicit in the Miranda warning itself.

Once

a defendant is informed that he constitutionally need not respond
to police questioning, his subsequent silence is "not
sufficiently probative of an inconsistency with his in-court
testimony to warrant admission of evidence thereof.11

Jxl. at 605

(quoting United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975)).
the other hand, where no Miranda warning has been given,
"[c]ommon law traditionally has allowed
witnesses to be impeached by their previous
failure to state a fact in circumstances in
which that fact naturally would have been
asserted. . . . Each jurisdiction may
formulate its own rules of evidence to
determine when prior silence is so
inconsistent with present statements that
-29-

On

impeachment by reference to such silence is
probative.•'
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. at 606 (quoting Jenkins v. Anderson,
447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980)).

Thus,

[i]n the absence of the sort of
affirmative assurances embodied in the
Miranda warnings, [the United States Supreme
Court does] not believe that it violates due
process of law for a State to permit crossexamination as to postarrest silence when a
defendant chooses to take the stand. A State
is entitled, in such situations, to leave to
the judge and jury under its own rules of
evidence the resolution of the extent to
which postarrest silence may be deemed to
impeach a criminal defendant's own testimony.
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 607. Utah courts have implicitly
recognized this same distinction.

Compare State v. Wiswell, 639

P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981) (prosecutorial misconduct warranted
reversal where prosecutor elicited testimony of the defendant's
post-Miranda silence), with State v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373, 375
(Utah 1982) (no error in admitting into evidence defendant's
post-arrest silence to refute defendant's claims that he never
had an opportunity to give an explanation of his activities to
the police).

Accord United States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d 1275,

1279-1280 (10th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1037 (1987)
(proper to allow evidence of defendant's pre-Miranda silence);
People v. 0'Sullivan, 217 Cal.App.3d 237, 265 Cal. Rptr. 784,
787-788 (1990) (no error in allowing into evidence defendant's
post-arrest but pre-Miranda silence to refute claims of defense).
Here, the record establishes that even prior to
defendant actually testifying, it was clear his defense was that
he was merely collecting a debt from Moor when the altercation

-•*n_

occurred (MT. 12-13; T. 41-43, 93-94, 98). In this context,
during the defense case and just prior to defendant testifying,
the State elicited, in cross-examining Officer Neeley, that
defendant never informed the police that he was collecting a
debt.

The evidence was directly probative of defendant's claim

of innocence; for if defendant was merely collecting a legitimate
debt, why would he have refused to give this explanation to the
police in response to their neutral question of "What is going on
here?".

Under the circumstances, the prosecutor properly

elicited impeaching evidence of defendant's failure to offer this
explanation at the time of his arrest.

The silence was not

government induced and was probative in judging the validity of
the exculpatory defense presented at trial.
As no constitutional violation was involved, the
admission of the evidence should be viewed as any other
evidentiary matter; that is, was it reliable and probative of an
issue at trial?
discretion.

As such, it is reviewable only for abuse of

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1035; State v. Brown,

771 P.2d at 1094.

Here, the trial court properly allowed its

admission.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT'S PREVIOUS CONVICTION
UNDER UTAH R. OF EVID. 609(a)(2) AS A CRIME
OF DISHONESTY; BUT, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE, THE ERROR IS HARMLESS.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence his prior conviction for robbery under
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2) as a crime of dishonesty.
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Additionally,

defendant contends that a plea of guilty is not a conviction for
purposes of the rule (Br. of App. at 22-27).

Because the State

concedes that the trial court erred in concluding that robbery
was automatically admissible under Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2) as a
crime of dishonesty, the State merely notes that defendant's
argument that a guilty plea alone cannot constitute a conviction
for purposes of the rule is without merit.

State v. Delashmutt,

676 P.2d 383, 384 (Utah 1983).
When this matter was raised pretrial, the trial court
did not have the benefit of State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653-656
(Utah 1989), in which the Utah Supreme Court concluded that theft
crimes are not necessarily crimes of dishonesty and therefore not
automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2).

Instead, the

trial court based its ruling on State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33
(Utah 1984), concluding:
Right now, I am following Cintron because I
think that is the law of the State and I
think that is the correct law of the State.
I hope they never change that, but this may
be the case that you want to try to convince
them of that. I will hold that robbery is a
crime of dishonesty.
MT. at 5). Because of its conclusion that the conviction was
automatically admissible, the court declined to apply the
balancing test of Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1) as delineated in State
v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1332-1334 (Utah 1986) (MT. 5).
Clearly, under the now applicable rulings of the Utah appellate
courts, the automatic admission of the robbery conviction to
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impeach defendant's credibility was error.

State v. Lanier, 778

P.2d 9, 10-11 (Utah 1989); State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 17-18
(Utah App. 1988).
However, the State submits that under the facts of this
case, the error is harmless. As will be discussed in the next
point, evidence of defendant's robbery conviction was properly
admitted on other grounds, that is, under Utah R. Evid. 404(b),
as evidence probative of defendant's intent (T2. 70-73).

Thus,

even if the conviction had not been admitted for impeachment
under Rule 609(a)(2), there is no reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for defendant.

State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d at 656

(citing State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1038, and State v. Banner,
717 P.2d at 1335).

Since the State presented sufficient evidence

and eyewitness testimony to prove defendant's guilt of the Moor
robbery, any erroneous admission of the prior conviction for
impeachment purposes should be viewed as harmless.

State v.

Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Utah 1989); State v. Bruce, 779
P.2d at 657. Accord State v. Brown, 771 P.2d at 1095; State v.
Wight, 765 P.2d at 19-20.

Compare State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d at

11.
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in allowing
proof under Rule 609 through the testimony of Paul Christensen
(Br. of App. at 29). This assertion is incorrect. The robbery
conviction for purposes of Rule 609 was introduced in the crossexamination of defendant (T2. 55). Subsequently, for purposes of
Utah R. of Evid. 404, to establish defendant's intent, Paul
Christensen testified to the details of the prior robbery. While
the State concedes error under Rule 609, there was no error under
Rule 404. This distinction will be thoroughly discussed under
Point IV of this brief.
Defendant has not argued on appeal that the evidence was
insufficent to convict defendant of robbery.
-33-

POINT IV
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CRIME WAS
PROPERLY ADMITTED AS REBUTTAL EVIDENCE UNDER
UTAH R. EVID. 404(b) TO PROVE HIS INTENT IN
COMMITTING THE PRESENT CRIME.
Defendant argues that aside from the admission of
defendant's prior robbery conviction for purposes of impeachment,
the trial court additionally erred in admitting, pursuant to Utah
R. Evid. 404(b), evidence of the prior crime to establish
defendant's intent in committing the present crime (Br. of App.
at 29) .
A trial court's rulings on evidentiary matters must be
upheld unless it is "manifest that the trial court so abused its
discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted,"
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1035. Accord, State v. Brown, 771
P.2d at 1094; State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335. An evidentiary
ruling as to the admission of evidence, under Utah R. Evid. 403,
will likewise only be reversed for abuse of discretion where the
admission of the evidence constituted harmful error.

State v.

Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989); State v. Larson, 775
P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989).

But, erroneous admission of evidence

will be deemed harmless where there is "convincing, properly
admitted evidence of all essential elements of the case," State
v. Bruce, 779 P.2d at 656.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) is a rule of inclusion.

Evidence

of prior acts is admissible if relevant to prove an element of
the crime, unless under Utah R. Evid. 403, the evidence's
probative value is "substantially outweighed" by its prejudicial
effect (T. 148). State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 1989);
-34-

State VJ „. J ami son

,

Utah Rules of Evidence, 85 Utah I,, He\ ihl, HI (I98fj).

B u t , the

State r e c o g n i z e s , that within the general r u l e , t h e Utah
i l | i[Ji » 11 1 ri I H

MlliJllS

Ilill'K

Ml l l i l

potential prejudicial effect

I II 1 / I ' l l

Jill 1 !

hull

( M i l l I SS I I ill '

11 I I I

IlllIMM

State v. R o c c o , 130 Utah Adv. R e p .

Ill, 17 (Utah 1990) (harmless error to adm i t prior and subsequent
I n I i JI t i"i 1 |ji11 w » » in I >

a

prior bad acts "reflective of the absence o\ mistake or accident,
\

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation

rr

knowledge

MeJ l t:i ty "'" ) ; State v. Gotschai..,

)

(no error to admit evidence ci other crime to ->how defendant s
state of mind an

defendan

State v. F l o r e z ,

-

other crime admissible

only

, c ':

*

,., f-defense);

J du i

prove element
;--L.

(Uta

~

. .~ . r - — -

:* . (evidence of

T i m e ; b u t , error to
1 42 1

12 7-4 2 8

(harmless error to admit evidence of other crimes ..

\Lmally probati

under Utai.

* i n t e n t ) ; State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d

609(2);

crimes under Uta>

error

404(b) t

, evidence . : fie:
show defendant'? XT^^T * ;

Sta te v , Jamison
admissible t o show opportunity and knowledge of technique u s e d ) ;
State v. Shickles,

295-96 (Utah 1988) (evidence of

ot ht*r crimps adm J h - .
Before turning

|.
*.

--'its of defendant's clai m, I t

important to recognize what defendant is i ic t claiming.
Defendant i s i 10 t asser Li ng t:l lat the evidence of t h e prior cri me

was in any way unreliable or contested.

Defendant had pled

guilty to the offense and was awaiting sentencing (MT. 2).
Defendant, neither pretrial, during trial nor on appeal, has ever
contested the accuracy of Paul Christensen's recitation of the
facts surrounding defendant's prior robbery.

Nor has defendant

asserted that the evidence's probative value was outweighed by
its prejudicial effect.

Instead, defendant argues that the

evidence entirely lacked any probative value (Br. of App. at 32).
Defendant improperly asserts that "Appellant's intent was not the
issue in conflict.

Rather, it was Appellant's physical actions

that were contested" (Br. of App. at 29). As such, defendant
claims that the evidence was not admitted to prove intent, but to
prove criminal propensity (Br. of App. at 29-30).

Defendant's

argument is factually and legally incorrect.
Defendant presented testimony that did not dispute the
physical acts of approaching the victim, Matthew Moor, seeking
money from Moor, remaining with Moor when he did not receive
sufficient money, going to Ivan Ilov's to get more money, the
altercation at Ilov's and the ensuing chase and altercation on
State Street (T2. 22-36).

Instead, defendant contested Moor's

statements as they related to his intent; that is, was defendant
merely requesting the repayment of a debt or was he robbing Moor?
While there was evidence corroborating Moor's description of what
occurred, the issue to be resolved by the jury came down to a
7
pure question of intent, no other elements were in dispute.
7
The only fact testified to by the victim which was disputed by
defendant, other than his intent in demanding money of Moor, was
the use of a weapon. Moor testified that defendant had a knife
or fascimile; defendant denied it (T. 19-20; T2. 38). The jury
negated the testimony that defendant had a weapon by returning a

w a

^ i ^

rif fiimnlp robberv (R. H2JK

Defendant attemptec
evidence itn a motion

II I In t s

m i •»«. 11 HI

imine

issue was argued
CJ

to the trial court pretrial # -

- *. -

- the State's case,

and after defendant testified (MT
case, the State argued , . *

'«t t-^idence was

admissible as a signature crime, i.e., modus operandi to prove
identi*

.

preparation

.U-in *•• - I ik/fendani " :•. IIIIHII! , |„»[HI),
"' . State argued that in J ight of the defense claim

that defendant coincidentally ran into the victim and asked him
fur

ill'! n t h j y

I it-' 11 ni I i mi mi en I I •« I 'J,

IAM "I | I Iif« i i M I I iii'i i l l

I In

1

i,"v i i l e i i c t f

u l

mi h .1.1111 I ci t

crime, committed within months of this crime, was probative of
defendant -

.-

of lacV nl intent (MM1

H, 1R-20; "T". % ; T2. 72-

1 U|M- 1 1 y i H M ' I v n ! niiiii\ I 1111111! 1:111 ing on trie i s s u e
until after defendant testified.

The trial court had a full

factual basi s as to the pri or r o b b e r y a n d i is p r o b a t i ve va ] ye 1 ii
1: e g 1
68-7 3)

f: 1: o o f : • f • :::! e f e n d a 1 1 tJ" s i n t e n t 1. r 1 the i n s t a n t c a s c::« (" I12 ,
."In considering the admission, the court applied the
St£tf

proper legal standard.
Based 011 the totality

v

S'licl.ie.-

" h- evidence

*• - ^ * JI,. t concluded t'.d

the probative value c *

:> evidence to prove defendants

was i ^ substantial!

t **.

1

usion IF insistent *

Gotschall, 782 P , 2d

'

-

e

:

•* trial court - ~uling.

Court should defer t;

-: • ••*

. >?JA_

:

*/JS
State v.

^nnson

1141-1142; State v, Shickles, 760 P.2d at 296; State v. Jamison,
767 P.2d at 1 3 ?.

-37-

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's judgment and
conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^^

day of May, 1990.
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